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In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in
particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the
DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue
of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an
assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue
of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this
conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with
DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2
took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility,
whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our
final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs
warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general
introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips,
and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances.General introduction
For the full text of the General Introduction to the entire
article, the reader is referred to Part 1 [1]. The General
Introduction reviewed the history of the article, which
originated in a controversy initiated by Robert Spitzer
and Allen Frances, Chairmen respectively of the DSM-
III and DSM-IV Task Forces, over the ongoing work of
the DSM-5 Task Force and Work Groups. In a series of
articles and blog postings in Psychiatric Times, Frances
(at times with Spitzer) carried out a sustained critique of* Correspondence: james.phillips@yale.edu
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumthe DSM-5 work in which he focused both on issues of
transparency and issues of process and content [2-15].
In the course of this debate over DSM-5 I proposed to
Allen in early 2010 that we use the pages of the Bulletin
of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy
and Psychiatry (of which I am Editor) to expand and
bring more voices into the discussion. This led to two
issues of the Bulletin in 2010 devoted to conceptual issues
in DSM-5 [16,17]. (Vol 17, No 1 of the AAPP Bulletin will
be referred to as Bulletin 1, and Vol 17, No 2 will be re-
ferred to as Bulletin 2. Both are available at http://alien.
dowling.edu/~cperring/aapp/bulletin.htm.) Interest in this
topic is reflected in the fact that the second Bulletin issue,
with commentaries on Frances’ extended response in theCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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over 70,000 words.
Also in 2010, as Frances continued his critique
through blog postings in Psychiatric Times, John Sadler
and I began a series of regular, DSM-5 conceptual issues
blogs in the same journal [18-31].
With the success of the Bulletin symposium, we
approached the editor of PEHM, James Giordano, about
using the pages of PEHM to continue the DSM-5 discus-
sion under a different format, and with the goal of reach-
ing a broader audience. The new format would be a series
of “essential questions” for DSM-5, commentaries by a
series of individuals (some of them commentators from
the Bulletin issues, others making a first appearance in this
article), and responses to the commentaries by Frances.
Such is the origin of this article. (The general introduction,
individual introductions, and conclusion are written by
this author (JP), the responses by Allen Frances.
For this exercise we have distilled the wide-ranging
discussions from the Bulletin issues into six questions:
1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of
mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current
state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a
cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, trans-
formative posture; 4) the role of pragmatic considera-
tions in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of
utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been
designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this
conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6)
the possibility and advisability, given all the problems
with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic
system. Part 1 [1] of this article covered the first two
questions, and Part 2 [32] the second two questions.
This text, Part 3, covers the fifth and six questions. The
final Part 4 of the article will contain the general
conclusion.
Question #5: How compatible are all the purposes of
DSM?
Is there a conflict over utility in the DSMs? The
authors of DSM-III, DSM-IV, and DSM-5 intend the
manuals to be useful for both clinicians and research-
ers. Is there a conflict between what is useful for clini-
cians and what is useful for researchers? Which group
is served better by DSM-III and DSM-IV, and by the
prospective changes in DSM-5?
Introduction
Any discussion of the utility question in DSM-5 should
begin with the way in which the previous manuals dealt
with this question. The first paragraph of the Introduction
to DSM-IV contains the following statements: “The utility
and credibility of DSM-IV require that it focus on its clin-
ical, research, and educational purposes and be supportedby an extensive empirical foundation. Our highest priority
has been to provide a helpful guide to clinical practice.
We hoped to make DSM-IV practical and useful for clini-
cians by striving for brevity of criteria sets, clarity of lan-
guage, and explicit statements of the constructs embodied
in the diagnostic criteria. An additional goal was to facili-
tate research and improve communication among clini-
cians and researchers” ([33], p. xv).
The primary achievement of DSM-III and DSM-IV was
the establishment of reliability through the use of diagnos-
tic criteria. The criteria worked to assure consistency of
diagnosis across settings. Psychiatrists using the same diag-
nosis had the comfort of knowing that they were talking
about the same patients - or that two psychiatrists evaluat-
ing the same patient would make the same diagnosis. As
sensible as this rationale is, it leaves questions open - who
in fact actually uses the diagnostic criteria, and for whom
are they really important?
In discussing these questions, we should not forget that
the DSM manuals also provide thorough descriptions of
the respective disorders, what we may call descriptive,
phenomenological, or prototypal accounts. Among the
various user groups - clinicians, students, and researchers,
to name the three cited in the above quotation from the
DSM-IV Introduction - who uses what? The available re-
search [34] supports one’s anecdotal impression that
experienced clinicians use the descriptive prototypes, call-
ing on the criteria for the occasional infrequently used
diagnosis, and that students and researchers are the main
users of the criteria. This is hardly surprising. Clinicians
are focused on treating their patients, not checking cri-
teria, and are usually working with a mental grasp of the
prototype; students are focused on learning the diagnoses;
and researchers are required to be careful that their
research subjects meet the criteria.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the diagnostic
criteria are mainly useful for researchers, who are obli-
gated to insure a uniform research population. In this re-
gard, it is an ironic side effect of the diagnostic criteria
that they may impede research by confining research
efforts to criteria-determined questions [35].
The introduction of dimensional measures into DSM-5
adds a further wrinkle to this discussion. Regier and col-
leagues have written: “The single most important precon-
dition for moving forward to improve the clinical and
scientific utility of DSM-5 will be the incorporation of
simple dimensional measures for assessing syndromes
within broad diagnostic categories and supraordinate
dimensions that cross current diagnostic boundaries.
Thus, we have decided that one, if not the major, differ-
ence between DSM-IV and DSM-5 will be the more
prominent use of dimensional measures in DSM-5” [36]
(see also [37]). These authors assure us once again that
these dimensions will provide clinical as well as scientific
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questions: should they even be in the manual, and who
will use them. The questions raised above about who will
use them are apposite here. Given their undemonstrated
scientific status, Frances challenged their introduction into
DSM-5 in Bulletin 2, and Paris and Whooley challenge it
below. First and colleagues have argued that any change in
the existing manual should use clinical utility as a criterion
of change [38], and First has expressed concern over the
dubious clinical utility of the proposed measures [39].Commentary: Useful for whom? clinicians, researchers,
and DSM’s many-sided nature
Owen Whooley, Ph.D.
Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging
Research
Rutgers University
The DSM serves many interests and performs many
tasks. It provides a common language of mental disorders
for clinicians, standardized categories for researchers, diag-
nostic codes for insurance companies, and valid diagnoses
of mental illness for legal and juridical purposes. Task
Forces of DSMs, past and present, have treated these tasks
as complimentary, but their diversity belies the inherent
tensions in the complex negotiation of these interests.
There is no tension more challenging than that between
psychiatric clinicians and researchers. The introductions
to each edition of the DSM state that the “highest priority”
of the manual is “to provide a helpful guide to clinical
practice,” ([33], p. xxiii). Yet, the manual is produced by
psychiatric researchers, who are attuned to different goals
(e.g. reliability, standardization, robust research designs,
and statistical analyses) than the average clinician. Indeed
clinicians are often portrayed as obstacles to these goals as
evident in the discussion around DSM-5. Framed as an
issue of “clinical utility”, this discussion focuses on the
mundane, practical limitations to reforming the clinical
practice - the extra paperwork, the pressing lack of time,
the need for computer access, and the unmanageability of
38-point personality scales. Clinicians, according to this
view, need to be accommodated by the Task Force, which
is charged with the impossible task of achieving a para-
digm shift with as little disruption as possible.
While these technical problems are real, the Task Force
reads them incorrectly. Misconstrued as a technical prob-
lem, the tension between researchers and clinicians in
psychiatry has deep roots that no clever construction of
new dimensional scales can solve. Rather than the specific
exigencies of clinical practice, the salient issue is epistemo-
logical in nature. Quite simply, the divergent roles that clin-
icians and researchers serve in the profession lead to
different orientations toward knowledge and competing
models of what constitutes useful psychiatric knowledge. Itis these differences that underwrite the debates over clinical
utility.
The epistemological tensions between researchers and
clinicians reflect a classic distinction, noted by Aristotle,
between episteme and phronesis [40]. Episteme is what we
now understand as scientific reasoning; its goal is to illu-
minate universal and general rules, to uncover timeless
Truth. This is how psychiatric researchers understand the
purpose of psychiatric knowledge. Since DSM-III, each edi-
tion of the DSM – including and especially DSM-5 - has
aimed for the standardization of psychiatric knowledge.
The continual push for more reliability in diagnosis is ani-
mated by a concurrent desire to reign in idiosyncratic, sub-
jective interpretations of clinicians, so that researchers can
accumulate objective data and achieve generalizable know-
ledge on mental disorders. Or in the words of DSM-III
([41], p. 7), researchers promote a standardized classifica-
tion system “with the lowest order of inference necessary”.
Clinicians, on the other, understand relevant psychiatric
knowledge differently, adopting a more practical posture
toward knowing. Practical wisdom, or what Aristotle calls
phronesis, addresses particular cases and specific quandar-
ies, employing, not maxims or rules, but a network of con-
siderations to be tested by trial and error. It operates in
the realm of the concrete, the temporal and the presump-
tive. The goal is not universal knowledge for its own sake,
but practical intervention through case-based reasoning.
In the phronesis of psychiatric practice, clinicians are not
interested in identifying a universal truth but a particular
one – what will work for a specific patient.
Phronesis and episteme are not inherently opposed. In
other branches of medicine this divide is bridged by con-
crete diagnostic tests and treatment protocols, backed by
research, which then inform – but do not dictate – clinical
practice. But, as of now, psychiatry lacks these bridges,
and simply reforming a nosological manual will not pro-
vide one, as it skewed toward standardization at the
expense of clinical intuition.
The recommendation of the DSM-5 Task Force to add
dimensional measurements to the current focus on diag-
nostic categories is likely to widen the divide between clin-
icians and researchers. In pivoting toward a more
dimensional model of mental illness, the Task Force has
embraced a project of quantification by introducing nu-
merical scales. These scales value information of a specific
kind, namely statistical, quantitative data. They aim to
transform the complex suffering of individual patients into
numerical values. In quantification, researchers shoot for
more standardization via quantification in the interest of
obtaining information on aggregate populations of patient.
This is at odds with the practical motives of clinicians.
Clinicians are oriented toward individual patients. Statis-
tical aggregates are of little use or relevance to them.
The patient can never be just a number. For clinicians,
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ledge is not only more bureaucratic headaches; it is an
attack on clinical discretion– an attempt to standardize
the patient/psychiatrist intervention that devalues the
nuance and particularistic thinking required for treating
patients. Dimensionalization carries with it great impli-
cations for identity of clinicians as knowers. It threatens
to alter the role of psychiatrists from interpreters to
measurers, as the dimensional revisions currently being
field tested (i.e. cross-cutting dimensional scales and se-
verity scales for each diagnosis) will, in effect, bookend
the clinical interaction with the production of numerical
data. The goal of reigning in discretion is evident in a
major justification for dimensionalization - to reduce the
need for clinical judgment in diagnosis so as to assist
non-psychiatrists ([34], p. 21). Such diagnosis by num-
bers threatens the hermeneutic tradition of the psychi-
atric practice, by promoting episteme at the expense of
phronesis.
The effort to standardize clinical practice through the
DSM fosters ambivalence (at best) and/or resentment (at
worst) in clinicians. It is perhaps unsurprising then that
many clinicians resist DSM reforms. In fact, this epistemo-
logical divide probably underlies clinicians’ long-standing
refusal to follow DSM protocols lock-step. DSM reformers
lament clinicians’ rejection of the GAF, their refusal to
adopt the multiaxial system, and the prevalent use of
vague, “garbage can” diagnoses like NOS category. Often
viewed as technical deficiencies with the DSM itself (i.e.
Regier et al. [36]), these practices might be better conceived
of as ways in which clinicians resist the imposition of the
DSM. These “workarounds” are assertions of phronesis, an
attempt to carve out a space of autonomy from the DSM
in practice [42].
Thus, on the eve of DSM-5, clinicians find themselves
in a complicated relationship with the DSM that dimen-
sionality is poised to worsen. On one hand, as members of
a profession, clinicians gain credibility from their associ-
ation with science and research. The DSM has played an
essential role in linking psychiatry to science for the last
thirty years. On the other hand, the more the needs of
researchers dictate the DSM and impinge on clinical prac-
tice, the more clinical intuition is devalued in those con-
texts. Scales may obtain more advanced statistical analyses
and knowledge but devalue clinical nuance in the process.
Researchers and clinicians do not see eye-to-eye on
dimensionality because their gazes are directed at different
targets, aggregate collectives and individual patients, re-
spectively. Rather than a bridge, dimensionality erects a
barrier between the episteme of researchers and the phron-
esis of clinicians. The existence of this epistemological div-
ide raises a question: can the DSM center hold? Instead of
hitching together to epistemologically divergent interests,
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Note that part of the reason we don’t understand enough
about psychiatric pathophysiology is that etiologic research
typically begins with a patient population defined by a
DSM diagnosis. Indeed, DSM-III was borne out of specific
efforts to improve reliability for research studies. But post-
DSM-III etiologic research has yielded mostly inconsistent
or heterogeneous findings, without discovering any kind of
“lesion” to account for psychiatric disorders. That research
hasn’t been a waste – it has provided important clues
about pathophysiology, along with bigger-picture evidence
that DSM diagnoses are constellations of symptoms for
which there are probably myriad etiologies.
While this conclusion has been cited as a justification
to create a new DSM-5 (i.e. if we redefine the diagnostic
criteria, then we can do a better job of “finding a le-
sion”), that kind of thinking is wrong-headed. Diagnostic
revision should follow, not precede, etiologic discoveries
– in other words, a new DSM-5 needs etiologic discover-
ies, but etiologic discoveries do not need a new DSM.
Indeed, novel directions in etiologic research have been
ongoing for some time, and are embodied in the NIMH’s
Research Domain Criteria Project that recognizes the
complexity of psychiatric illnesses as dysregulations of
neural networks and focuses its pathophysiologic spot-
light, not so much on DSM disorders, but on endophe-
notypes and dimensions of symptoms both within and
across disorders [43]. When and if those research efforts
come to fruition, it will be time to welcome a radical
new revision of the DSM.
In the meantime, etiologic research in particular must op-
erate outside the bounds of DSM-IV, and will not greatly
benefit from the proposed revisions for the DSM-5. In this
way, there is a conflict over utility between clinicians and
researchers, and one manual cannot satisfy both goals [44].
But that is not to say that all psychiatric research should
disengage from the DSM – on the contrary, clinical re-
search (i.e. therapeutic trials) based on DSM disorders is a
continued necessity to guide clinical practice. Such com-
plexities arising from the different intended applications of
the DSM indicate how important it is to consider “con-
textual utility” [45] when deciding whether or how DSM
should evolve.
Commentary: The DSMs: A wedge between clinician and
clinical researcher?
Aaron L. Mishara, Ph.D.
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology
Michael A. Schwartz, M.D.
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In response to question # 5, we propose that beginning
with DSM-III there is a decided conflict between what is
useful for clinicians and researchers. However, this need
not be the case. This conflict has more to do with the
built-in agenda of the DSMs following DSM-III than
with the nature of either diagnosis or research. We
propose some fruitful ways for the two to work together.
Learning from history: DSM-III’s research agenda
DSM-III’s [46] revolutionary neo-Kraeplinians were
dedicated to setting up a research program rather than
accurately reflecting clinical realities. Embracing Carl
Hempel’s [47] logical empiricist agenda, they approached
mental disorders in terms of operational definitions for
the purpose of enhancing reliability in diagnosis [48].
Mayes and Horwitz [49] write: "Spitzer selected a group
of psychiatrists and consultant psychologists who were
committed primarily to medically oriented, diagnostic
research and not to clinical practice" (p. 259). That is,
there was and remains a divide between DSM-III and
later DSM's prescriptive diagnostic practices for
researchers and what clinicians actually do in prac-
tice. Far from bridging clinical practice and clinical re-
search, DSM- III inserted a wedge between clinician and
clinical researcher. Millon [50] writes: “Operational defi-
nitions are too restrictive. They preclude extensions to
new situations that are even slightly different from the
original defining condition” (p. 249). The original criteria
used as the initial basis for the specified diagnostic cri-
teria for the major diagnostic categories of DSM-III were
regarded exclusively as “research diagnostic criteria”
(RDCs), e.g., Williams and Spitzer [51]. In their zeal for
reliable diagnosis, DSM-III advocates overlooked that
the Hempelian approach they adopted was only one ap-
proach that neglected more phenomenologic approaches
[52].
Diagnosis is not a checklist but an interactive, embodied
social cognitive process
Schwartz and Wiggins [53] proposed that clinicians in their
practice use a different approach than that outlined by the
neo-Kraeplinian embrace of Hempelian nomological sci-
ence: the clinician's experience is already pervaded by typifi-
cations which help to structure the clinicians’ diagnosis
meaningfully. The founder of philosophic phenomenology,
Husserl, had indicated that perceptual meaning is itself
based on such a typification process. We never perceive the
individual thing or person but always in terms of the type
that implicitly subsumes it. We perceive the not yet known
in terms of the known, i.e., in terms of the general type that
is activated in the particular perception. With each view,
there is built a reference to the next anticipated view based
on past experience of this and similar objects. Thereferences between aspects are anticipatory constraints,
which are nevertheless open to revision or cancellation in
their structure so that each aspect prefigures its successor
in seamless transition as belonging to the same perceptual
object.
As any other expertise, diagnostic decision making is
informed by largely unconscious processes. There is a
“gut feeling” which rapidly guides the expert to the most
fitting response in completely new contexts or “situa-
tions” (cf. Millon’s comment above)? The philosopher
Gadamer [54] calls this process “hermeneutics,” the “art” of
“interpretative application,” how the rule is somehow opti-
mally applied to the particular case. The well-known neur-
ologist, Damasio finds this process to be governed by what
he calls “somatic markers.” Here, bodily or gut feelings
based on past experience subtly “bias” current decision
making often in an unnoticed manner (for hermeneutics-
somatic marker relationship, see Mishara [55]).
Bransford and colleagues [56] note that very often the
experts themselves are unable to provide an account of
the decision processes leading to expert judgment in the
particular case. They cannot articulate the “tacit know-
ledge” that guides their practice. Developing this sort of
expertise takes years of training, a repeated learning by
doing in each case to the individual situation, i.e., a
learning by examples, whereby the learning after a while
becomes automatic. We see the same sort of learning
underlying diagnostic practice [57].
Paradigm shift: Phenomenological-clinical neuroscience
The phenomenologic approach prepares the way for a
paradigm shift from the biomedical model of DSM-III, and
subsequent DSMs, to a more “person centered medicine.”
Citing the Spanish existential-philosopher Ortega y Gasset,
“I am I and my circumstance,” Mezzich and colleagues
write, “Respect for the patient’s autonomy, values, and dig-
nity represents a fundamental recognition of his or her per-
sonhood, and an ethical imperative. Slowly these concepts
are finding their way into evidence.” ([58], pp. 304–305)
By checking off symptoms, i.e., by focusing solely on
whether the patient’s responses fulfill diagnostic criteria, we
stop asking the patient what she or he experiences. We take
interest only in the client’s responses to the extent that they
fulfill our predefined operationalized diagnostic criteria.
These operationalized responses exclude further explor-
ation of the patient’s experience. By relying solely on the
DSM, researchers and clinicians actually pre-empt the fur-
ther research of how the patient’s subjective experience can
be mapped onto underlying neural processes and therefore,
how it can be treated. We believe that the proposed para-
digm shift to a more phenomenological-clinical neurosci-
ence will provide a more holistic, narrative, strength based
(empowering), contextual, culturally sensitive approach and
eventually, a new understanding of mental disorders.
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Recently, we critiqued the metaphoric toolbox: “the clinical
researcher, Mary Phillips proposes a ‘psychiatric toolbox’
(i.e., neuropsychological tests, neuroimaging, genotyping)
to develop disorder ‘biomarkers’ that are persistent, rather
than state-dependent. This would obviate the phenomeno-
logical research of the patient’s subjective experience of the
disorder. The danger will be, however, that we will define
disorders in terms of what technologies we have available.”
([59], p. 61)
We advise similar caution when using this metaphor in
the application of phenomenology to clinical neuroscience.
There are numerous methodological and conceptual pro-
blems in claiming that a pre-reflective awareness of self (as
“immediately” given in self-affection) provides a “toolbox”
for clinical neuroscience [60]. In this regard we agree with
Schwabe and Blanke [61] that toolbox constructs, e.g., pu-
tative prereflective self-awareness, are unable to account for
disruption of self-experience in such phenomenologically
complex neuropsychiatric symptoms as autoscopy. Auto-
scopy is “a loosely related complex of experiences in which
one sees (or experiences) a ‘double’ as external to one’s
current vantage point” [62]. Here there are “at least two
simultaneous or rapidly alternating embodied perspectives”
(p. 75), which cannot be accounted for by the putative
“phenomenological” toolbox. This argument will be spelled
out in more detail in a subsequent publication.
Rather, phenomenological clinical neuroscience must
take a different direction which we [59] outlined in our
previous responses to Allen Frances.
The two phenomenological psychiatrists, Klaus Conrad
[63] (see Mishara [64]) and Henri Ey, employed the nine-
teenth century neurologist, Hughlings Jackson’s approach
to classification in terms of describing and formalizing the
subjective experience of the patient as a field of conscious-
ness which is disrupted in its organizing activity precisely in
response to the degree of severity of the underlying neuro-
biologic disturbance. . . . [They] anticipated the kind of
modeling of mental disorders later done by neural net-
works, animal models, and drug challenge studies with
healthy individuals in the following sense. If we are able to
describe and verbally capture everyday ‘healthy’ conscious-
ness in terms of its ‘field’ organization, then we are able to
model disorders by seeing how this “field of consciousness”
is specifically disrupted in a particular mental disorder (as
we currently classify it) by disabling this or that component
of consciousness. To elaborate on this analogy: Neural net-
work models, for example, simulate mental disorders by
“damaging” this or that part of the network. Similarly, ani-
mal models lesion a crucial part of circuitry and drug
models alter neurotransmitter signaling. In each case, the
mental disorder is ‘modeled’ by systematically removing
or altering some aspect of healthy functioning thought tobe implicated in the disorder. Similarly, these phenom-
enological psychiatrists begin with healthy waking con-
sciousness and by ‘damaging’ or ‘removing’ healthy
components of this consciousness (in as it were intro-
spective, phenomenologic thought experiments, what
Husserl called ‘imaginative variation’), attempt to pro-
duce the subjective experience of symptoms until they
arrive at a plausible model. In this way, . . . both Conrad
and Ey apply a Jacksonian hierarchical approach to ner-
vous functioning in the organization of the patient’s
‘field of consciousness. ([59], p. 65)
It was Hughlings Jackson who proposed a two-tiered
system for diagnosis – with one tier reserved for clinical
practice and a second for research: “There are two kinds of
classification of diseases: one scientific, generally called the-
oretical, for the advancement of knowledge; one empirical
or clinical, for practice” ([65], p. 33). We propose that by
using the patient’s subjective experience of ‘symptoms’ as a
standard, there should be ongoing studies of bidirectional
feedback between clinical practice and the diagnostic clas-
sifications operationalized by researchers to further refine
these classifications([59], p. 62).
In conclusion, “phenomenology is not the antithesis to
operationalism but precisely the step required to trans-
late the patient’s subjective experience of symptoms, etc.,
into workable operationalizable hypotheses which can be
quantifiably measured using the experimental methods
of clinical neuroscience (see Mishara, [55], p. 64).
Allen Frances responds: Serving many masters
Psychiatric classifications are like maps – and like maps
there is no single best way of charting the territory. De-
pending on our purpose, we may prefer to use a geological
map, or a political map, or a topographical map, or an
economic map, or a climate map-or some combination.
Similarly, it might have made sense to have different and
complementary DSMs – one for clinicians, another for
researchers, and others for education, for forensics, for
billing, for gathering statistics, and so on. The DSM we
have is a common denominator, with both the strengths
and the weaknesses that derive from attempting to serve
so many different masters.
Let's do the weaknesses first. DSM-IV is far too
detailed for clinicians; not nearly detailed enough for
researchers; too boring for students; too imprecise for
use in the courtroom; too long for insurance coders. It
easily could have been fashioned into five different clas-
sificatory maps, each addressed to a different function
and a different set of users.
But much would have been lost in the translation. How-
ever imperfect the fit to all of its tasks, DSM-IV has the
great strength of bringing one unifying language to all of
them. Its great value in bridging the clinical research inter-
face would be lost if clinicians and researchers were
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the system they will someday use even if the stilted prose
is not much fun to read. DSM would have less clinical
credibility were it written only for legal or insurance
purposes.
DSM-IV does none of its jobs perfectly and its awkward
fit certainly creates a variety of problems. Some clinicians
refuse to learn DSM and stick to their own personal pro-
totypes of disorders. Many epidemiological researchers
ignore the requirement for clinical significance before
making a psychiatric diagnosis and therefore report ridicu-
lously high rates of mental illness in the general popula-
tion. Some students take the DSM descriptions too
literally and lose the patient as they evaluate the criteria.
Lawyers often find loopholes because the language of
DSM is frustratingly below legal requirements for preci-
sion. And so on.
But the unifying and synthesizing whole of DSM-IV is
still worth much more than would be the accumulated
sum of its individual parts. However imperfect, the
DSM's special value is as a common denominator that
avoids a Babel and is good enough (if admittedly not
best) at each of its jobs.
Response to Dr Whooley: This is an erudite discussion
of an important issue. I agree completely with his critique
of the DSM-5 proposals for impossibly complex dimen-
sional evaluations. These were concocted by research types
who have no understanding of the needs of clinical prac-
tice. But however ridiculous the proposals, the DSM center
will hold because clinicians will simply ignore what they
can't possibly use. It is unfortunate that the DSM-5 dimen-
sions were not done in a simple, clinically friendly way, but
they will not do much harm beyond giving dimensions an
unnecessarily bad name.
Response to Dr Pierre: I love this quote,"a new DSM
needs etiologic discoveries, but etiologic discoveries
don't need a new DSM." Etiological discoveries will fol-
low their own pace uninfluenced by DSM.
Response to Drs Mishara and Schwarz: We agree
that DSM-III represented a takeover by the research criter-
ion approach of what had previously been a simple, intui-
tively applied clinical manual. We disagree on the impact. I
think this was mostly to the good; DSM-III focused on the
problems created by the existing manual. DSM-II was an
essentially worthless document that represented a dead end
for psychiatry. DSM-III was undoubtedly flawed in many
ways, but it was also a salvation for psychiatry and a great
help for its patients.
Spitzer's innovation was to apply his experiences creating
the Research Diagnostic Criteria to the essentially clinical
task of creating DSM-III. Only someone with Spitzer's vi-
sion and stubborn determination could have moved the
field so far toward a criterion based system. DSM-III was
absolutely essential in keeping psychiatric diagnosisrelevant, in providing the possibility of reliable diagnosis, in
furthering research, and in bridging the clinical/research
interface.
The phenomenological approach advocated by Drs Mis-
hara and Schwarz may provide a richer and more nuanced
view of the individual, but one that is inherently inferential
and unreliable. This is a useful listening style for the clin-
ician trying to understand the patient's inner experience,
but it is not a reliable guide to diagnostic decision making.
"Gut feelings" are invaluable in therapists, often misleading
for diagnosticians.
Question #6: Is DSM the only way to do
diagnosis?
Given the problems in DSM-III, DSM-IV, and (likely)
in DSM-5, would you argue for an alternative, more
rational diagnostic system than the DSM? Could you
describe it? Would your alternative system simply re-
place the DSM or restructure it in a major way?
Introduction
Should the activist stance toward change proposed by
some commentators in question 3 be carried to another
level – that of replacing the manual with an alternative,
more rational one? Or, if not replacing the manual, of
restructuring it substantially?
We can sort the possible responses to this question into
three groups: alternative systems already in development,
alternative nosological systems developed by the commen-
tators themselves, and major restructuring proposals for
the DSM. For a representative of the first group we have
First’s presentation of the NIMH Research Domain Cri-
teria Project (RDoC). In the second group belongs Pies’
proposal (along with those of Hayes, Mender, Mishara and
Schwartz, Peled, and Pies in Bulletin 2). And to represent
the third group we have Paris’ discussion of the thrust to-
ward dimensional measures in DSM-5 (also covered by
Whooley in the preceding question).
Commentary: The national institute of mental
health research domain criteria (RDoC) project:
Moving towards an etiologically-informed
diagnostic classification in psychiatry
Michael B. First, M.D.
Columbia University Department of Psychiatry
The diagnostic categories in the DSM and the ICD are
defined in terms of syndromes, i.e., symptoms that cluster
together and co-vary over time. When these were first
introduced into DSM-III in 1980, it was widely assumed
that although the identified psychiatric syndromes con-
sisted entirely of descriptive symptoms, their underlying
neurobiological mechanisms and pathophysiology would
eventually be elucidated and that one day psychiatric dis-
orders would be defined using objective laboratory
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tunately, however, after 30 years of intensive efforts by the
research community, not a single biological marker or
gene has been discovered that is useful in making a psychi-
atric diagnosis [66]. Although this frustrating lack of pro-
gress stems mostly from the fact that the problem of
trying to understand the underlying etiology and patho-
physiology of mental disorders has turned out to be much
more complex than originally anticipated, it is likely that
the categorical descriptive DSM system itself is at least
partly to blame. Scientists attempting to discover the
neurobiological or genetic underpinnings of psychiatric ill-
nesses have all too often treated the man-made psychiatric
constructs in the DSM as if they were “natural kinds,”
looking for the gene for schizophrenia or the neurocircui-
try underlying major depression as if they were real disease
entities [67-69]. Perhaps whatever specificity there is be-
tween biological findings and behavioral correlates is being
obscured by employing the DSM categories as if they were
phenotypes, rather than focusing on more fundamental
behavioral elements which cut across the various extant
DSM categories.
The NIMH-sponsored Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
project is intended to establish “a framework for creating
research classifications that reflect functional dimensions
stemming from translational research on genes, circuits,
and behavior.” ([70], p. 989). The RDoC project is a direct
consequence of one of the aims of the NIMH 2008 stra-
tegic plan, namely, to “develop, for research purposes, new
ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions
of observable behavior and neurobiological measures.”[71].
Using the DSM or the ICD categories as the basis for
selecting research subjects invites researchers to seek a
one-to-one relationship between putative mechanisms and
clinically-defined disorder categories. The goal of RDoC is
to instead shift researchers towards a focus on dysregulated
neurobiological systems as the organizing principle for
selecting study populations. The initial stage of the RDoC
project is to specify those basic dimensions of psychological
functioning and their implementing brain circuits that have
been the focus of neuroscience research over the past
several decades. Since the ultimate goal of the RDoC pro-
ject is to link dysfunctions in neurocircuitry with clinically
relevant psychiatric conditions, a priority in the selection of
domains is that they can be related to problem behaviors
that can be found in the symptom lists of conventional dis-
order categories [72,73]. The preliminary RDoC working
draft has identified five major domains of functioning, each
containing multiple, more specific constructs: the Negative
Valence Systems domain which includes constructs for
fear, distress, and aggression, the Positive Valence Systems
domain which includes reward seeking and learning and
habit formation constructs, the Cognitive Systems domain
which includes constructs for attention, perception,working memory/executive function, long term memory
and cognitive control, the Systems for Social Processes
domain including separation fear, facial expression regula-
tion, behavioral inhibition, and emotional regulation con-
structs, and the Arousal/Regulatory Systems domain
which include systems involved in sleep and wakefulness.
It is important to understand that the RDoC project is
not intended to function as a diagnostic classification
system in the way that the DSM and ICD do. Unlike the
DSM, ICD, and other medical classifications which are
designed to exhaustively describe and delineate the dif-
ferent ways that psychiatric patients might present
symptomatically in terms of conceptually high-level con-
cepts such as disease or disorder, the RDoC project is
primarily a research framework to assist researchers in
relating the fundamental domains of behavioral func-
tioning to their underlying neurobiological components.
As such, for each of the constructs noted above, the
current state-of-the-art measurements/elements at sev-
eral different units of analysis will be listed, including
genes, molecules, cells, circuits, behavior and self –re-
port [73]. Thus, in concrete terms, the RDoC framework
is being implemented as a matrix, with the constructs
forming the rows and the various units of analysis form-
ing the columns. In order to fill in the various cells in
the matrix, NIMH is in the process of convening a series
of conferences involving experts from each of the do-
main areas for the purpose of refining the list of
domains and constructs; this includes providing working
definitions, as well as compiling for each unit of analysis
a listing of the measures and components that contem-
porary research has identified as pertaining to a particu-
lar construct.
The RDoC approach represents a true paradigm shift in
the classification of mental disorders, moving away from
defining disorders based on descriptive phenomenology
and instead focusing on disruptions in neural circuitry as
the fundamental classificatory principle. Whether RDoC
ultimately bears fruit in terms of eventually improving
clinicians’ ability to predict prognosis or treatment re-
sponse will depend on how well this new approach per-
forms for research [43], something that will takes years or
even decades to fully realize. But every long journey
begins with a first step; taking a fresh start in the way the
RDoC project is planning to do is clearly the way to go.
Commentary
Ronald Pies, M.D.
SUNY Upstate Medical University Department of
Psychiatry
Even for those of us with plentiful ego supplies, outlining
an alternative to the DSM system in fewer than a thousand
words poses quite a challenge! Accordingly, I would refer
the reader to my more detailed comments in Bulletin 2. In
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of our classification scheme to the Manual of Brain-
Mediated Disease, or MBMD; 2. Conceptualizing MBMD
conditions as “instantiations of disease” in so far as they
entail substantial suffering and incapacity (dis-ease) – not
as reified entities in a physical sense; 3. Separating clinical
descriptions of disease (“prototypes”) from research-
oriented criteria; and 4. Drawing upon six foundational
principles (“The 6 Ps”), as follows:
“Privilege” refers to strict limitations on what sort of
conditions are permitted into the diagnostic schema:
i.e., only conditions that entail substantial intrinsic
suffering and incapacity would be “admitted” into the
MBMD.
“Prototypes” refers to the use of idealized models or
archetypes of disease, rather than either “categorical”
or “dimensional” methods of classification.
“Pragmatism” refers to the instrumental nature of the
diagnostic schema; specifically, psychiatric diagnosis is
seen fundamentally as a means toward the effective relief
of certain kinds of human suffering and incapacity.
“Parsimony” refers to the goal usually expressed in
terms of Occam’s Razor; i.e., “entities should not be
multiplied beyond what is necessary."
“Pluralism” refers to the use of multiple types of
evidence and levels of understanding in deciding what
ought to count as instantiations of brain-mediated
(“psychiatric”) disease.
Finally, “Phenomenology” –i.e., the contents and struc-
ture of the patient’s felt experience—would be an import-
ant part of the prototypical descriptions in the MBMD.
Now, I am keenly aware that the designation “brain-
mediated disease” creates philosophical problems for many
scholars, and this term is not to be confused with the desig-
nation brain disease. (Disease, as I have argued elsewhere,
is properly predicated of persons, not of tissues or organs.
See [35,74,75]). My colleague, Michael A. Schwartz MD,
has suggested the alternative term “psychiatric disorders”
(personal communication, Jan. 17, 2011), and others might
prefer the title, “Manual of Neuropsychiatric Disease.” In
my view, either term would be a vast improvement over
the troublesome Cartesian vestige, “mental disorders.”
How might my proposal work for a particular condition,
such as schizophrenia? Here is a greatly truncated repre-
sentation of the MBMD prototype for schizophrenia:
Sal is a 30-year-old single male whose chief complaint
is “I can’t find pieces of me and the pieces I do haveare fading, fading, fading, inter-dimensionally.” Sal’s
problems began when he was about 14. According to
his parents, Sal began to withdraw from friends and
schoolmates and “seemed to enter a world of his own.”
He became increasingly unable to maintain his
hygiene, school performance, or social relations, often
spending days at a time secluded in his room and
refusing to shower. He would eat only foods that had
been “de-contaminated from radiation,” which he
believed was being “beamed” into the house. By age 18,
Sal complained of “voices eating away at my brain,”
and described hearing several persons discussing him
in derogatory terms while alone in his room. At times,
Sal would laugh or giggle inappropriately, as when
attending the funeral of a family member. . .
Of course, the “real” MBMD would provide a much
more detailed and comprehensive prototype. When
warranted by epidemiological and clinical data, proto-
typical descriptions of disease subtypes would be pro-
vided; e.g., “paranoid” or “catatonic” subtypes of
schizophrenia (though arguably, these subtypes are not
adequately supported by existing studies). In addition,
under the rubric of “Ancillary Findings,” the MBMD
would provide data on prototypical neuropsychological
findings; brain imaging and related neurophysiological
data; and a rich description of the patient’s “inner
world,” such as provided by Silvano Arieti in his classic
text, Interpretation of Schizophrenia [76]. The general
nature of the “suffering and incapacity” would be
described in detail for a given condition. There would
be no specific “necessary and sufficient” criteria for ap-
plying a diagnosis, in the manner of the “3 from column
A, 2 from column B” approach of the DSMs; rather, the
clinician would be prompted to decide if the overall de-
scription of the prototype and its ancillary findings gen-
erally fit well with the patient’s history, mental status
exam, and experience of the world. A list of exclusion
criteria would also be provided; e.g., “the patient’s con-
dition is not more likely due to brain injury, intoxica-
tion, substance abuse,” etc., though these could well be
co-morbid diagnoses. In short, the prototypes would be
“fuzzier” than the research diagnostic criteria provided
in a separate part of the MBMD, but would be consistent
with those criteria. (Readers old enough to remember
the DSM-II (1968) will probably be amused at the
superficial resemblance of my MBMD prototypes to
descriptions in the DSM-II – ironic, but quite
intentional! However, unlike the DSM-II descriptions,
the MBMD prototypes would be written from a patient-
based perspective).
Finally, I would like to see the MBMD simplify the
overall psychiatric disease classification. I believe that
the vast majority of clinically-significant instantiations of
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ing general categories:
– Disturbances of Mood, Affect and Emotion
– Disturbances of Reality Perception and Psychic
Integration
– Disturbances of Attention, Cognition and Memory
– Disturbances of Appetitive Behavior or Impulse
Control
– Disturbances of Interpersonal Relations and Social
Adaptation
– Disturbances with “mixed” or overlapping features
Ultimately, I would envision an integration of these
general categories with emerging data on endopheno-
types, biological markers, and brain neurocircuits. But
this should not diminish the emphasis the MBMD will
give to phenomenology: the unique “felt experience” of
the patient.
I use the term “brain-mediated” in two senses. The
“loose”, ordinary-language sense holds that a condition
or disease is brain-mediated if most salient aspects of
the condition are explained by, or associated with, the
function and dysfunction of the brain, and not some
other organ. On this view, both schizophrenia and epi-
lepsy are instantiations of “brain-mediated disease.” Al-
ternatively, the “strong form” of the argument holds that
a condition is “brain-mediated” when the brain is both
necessary and sufficient to account for the relevant
“inputs” and “outputs” of the condition. “Inputs” refer to
the proximate etiological factors (e.g., abnormal dopa-
mine levels, head trauma, etc.) leading to disease; “out-
puts” refer to the experiential and behavioral expressions
of the condition (e.g., hallucinations, delusions, seizures,
etc.). The “strong” definition – for reasons beyond the
scope of this piece – is clearly harder to defend than the
ordinary-language version.
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The introduction of widespread dimensional measures
into DSM-5 involves this as well as the previous ques-
tion. Revisions of the DSM system must give a strong
priority to clinical utility. When diagnoses become too
complex, they will not be made, and patients suffer the
consequences. The more complicated features proposed
for DSM-5, such as dimensional scales, should be
reserved for research purposes. Clinical diagnosis, whichis carried out by busy practitioners, benefits from
streamlining and simplicity.
Specifically, the dimensionalization of diagnosis proposed
for personality disorders, as well as the proposals for scales
to measure functioning, and for scales that assess disorders
within a wider pathological spectrum, all lack clinical utility.
Clinicians will not be interested in dimensions unless they
are measured in a practical way, as for example, blood pres-
sure. Asking them to score patients on multiple dimen-
sional scales is impractical, and as First points out [39], the
consequences of failure of usage due to poor utility could
be even more serious than leaving the system unrevised.
This problem raises another question: why does the
DSM system not consider separating the use of its manual
for clinical and research purposes. Clinicians do not have
time to make diagnoses using complex procedures, and
should not be expected to spend more than a few minutes
making a decision. Researchers, on the other hand, have
the luxury of using complex measure to be precise, and
need to have measures that have strong scientific valid-
ation. Failure to separate these uses of the manual is a
deficit that affects the entire system.
Allen Frances responds: Alternate universes must prove
themselves
Every month or so, someone (usually very smart and pas-
sionate) sends me a detailed proposal for a new diagnostic
system offered as an alternative to the jumbled, pedestrian,
atheoretical, and purely descriptive method used in DSM.
The new system is invariably theory driven, clever, neat,
and plausible. Surely, it is quite easy to be more coherent
than a DSM that consists of a jumble of disorders gath-
ered together largely through a historical accreting process
based mostly on clinical observation and descriptive
research – without an underlying theory or deep know-
ledge of causality.
The new systems come in 3 types: 1) Brain biology –
these used to be based on correlates with neurotrans-
mitters, but recently neural networks of various kinds
are much more popular; 2) Psychological dimensions –
hundreds of scales have been developed and carefully
tested; and 3) Systems based on psychodynamic, etho-
logical, and developmental models – less popular now
than they once were.
Unfortunately, none of these approaches, however ele-
gant, is remotely ready for inclusion in the official system
of psychiatric nomenclature. DSM must by its very nature
be a conservative document that follows and never leads
the field. The problem with all of the suggestions to re-
place the admitted DSM jumble is that there are so many
contenders, none of which has been proven or has
attained wide acceptance from the field. It is also not pos-
sible to choose one from among so many plausible, but
necessarily parochial systems, when most clinicians have
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of rival systems can make about equally valid claims for
their respective pet methods.
The DSM-IV experience with the personality disorders
was a rude and disheartening awakening. I very much
hoped to include a (at least optional) dimensional per-
sonality rating scale. We were able to gather together in
one room the proponents of all the competing dimen-
sional systems to attempt the selection of one or some
compromise among them. It didn't work – we could not
forge a consensus because each participant remained
wedded to his own scale (however minimally different it
was from its near neighbors). Without wide agreement,
it is impossible to force a field to accept changes that
represent one necessarily narrowly defined perspective.
The DSM-5 effort to include personality dimensions will
also undoubtedly fail – for this reason as well as for its
unbelievably byzantine complexity.
I feel sure that our clumsy descriptive classification may
not be the only, or even the optimal way, to sort things for
future research. But I feel equally certain that the DSM
remains necessary to carry forth the current, everyday,
practical clinical and administrative work that are its first
priority. Once we have attained a widely accepted, etio-
logical understanding of at least some forms of psycho-
pathology, the new insights will gradually replace our
clumsy, but nonetheless now still useful system.
At this stage in this arena, the wisdom of the
philosopher Vico trumps the much greater and better
known Descartes. Descartes sought to use what we now
call Cartesian rationality and mathematical order to sort
what were previously seemingly disorderly phenomena.
This turned out to be a screaming success in the math-
ematical, physical and chemical worlds, but has (as Vico
predicted) much less purchase in understanding the
sloppy complicatedness of human affairs – including
psychiatric diagnosis.
Response to Dr First: I agree that NIMH's RDoC
project is the best hope for revolutionary advances in
psychiatric diagnosis and in our understanding of psy-
chopathology. But the obstacles are huge. The complex-
ity of the brain has dwarfed the reach of even our most
powerful research tools. Our science will advance, but
probably will uncover vast new territories of our ignor-
ance for every new beachhead of new knowledge. It may
take decades of concerted effort for this project to bear
clinical fruit and impact on the diagnostic system. It is
an open question whether NIMH will be able to mount
the necessary sustained commitment. Many things
could derail the future momentum of this project –
budget constraints, a new director with different goals,
a lack of cooperation among scientists, a lack of findings
or findings that caste things in a different light. RDoC is
indeed our most promising seed – let us hope it growsand thrives. But the prospects for its future success are
unpredictable in these early days.
Response to Dr Pies: Dr Pies offers a plausible possible
alternative to DSM diagnosis, but certainly not one that is
compelling enough to cry out for acceptance. There are
obvious problems: 1) Dr Pies' prototypal system of clinical
diagnosis is a throwback to DSM II and would likely create
the familiar problems of low reliability and a complete dis-
connect between clinical practice and research; 2) We
agree that DSM may be too much a splitter's system, but
Dr Pies' big lumps would fail to capture the complexity
and heterogeneity of clinical presentations; and, most im-
portant; 3) there are no compelling data to support that
the system would work. In the absence of scientific ad-
vance supporting and requiring change, this exercise in
reorganizing our tired descriptive psychiatry feels like fur-
niture rearrangement – not likely to further our field.
Response to Dr Paris: I agree completely re the foolish-
ness of the DSM-5 dimensions, but place more value on
having one system used by both clinicians and researchers.
Conclusion
As with the previous four questions, commentaries and
responses on the final two offer a mix of opinion, with
both agreement and occasional disagreement. Regarding
the fifth question, utility, Frances agrees with the specific
critique of the proposed DSM-5 dimensional measures
as offending clinical utility, but not with the more gen-
eral critique of DSM-III & IV as embodying unresolved
conflicts between clinical and research utility. He is, after
all, responsible for the DSM-IV statement:
The utility and credibility of DSM-IV require that it
focus on its clinical, research, and educational purposes
and be supported by an extensive empirical foundation.
Our highest priority has been to provide a helpful guide to
clinical practice. We hoped to make DSM-IV practical and
useful for clinicians by striving for brevity of criteria sets,
clarity of language, and explicit statements of the con-
structs embodied in the diagnostic criteria. An additional
goal was to facilitate research and improve communica-
tion among clinicians and researchers. ([33], p. xv).
Let’s first recognize that the fifth question, “Is there a
conflict over utility in the DSMs?,” contains in fact three
questions: is there a conflict among the various goals?,
what goal or purpose is served best?, and would we have
been better off with more than one manual? Frances
tends to acknowledge the first, ignore the second, and
center his argument around responding to the third
question in favor of a single manual. He concludes that
“[h]owever imperfect, DSM's special value is as a com-
mon denominator that avoids a Babel and is good
enough (if admittedly not best) at each of its jobs.” Un-
like the pluralogue in the other questions, where some
or most of the commentators were on Frances’ side of
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commentators lined up against him: all recognizing the
clinical/research conflict, all agreeing that DSM-IV is pre-
judiced toward research, and two of the three opting for
separating clinical and research diagnostic documents.
With their agreement that there is a conflict between
the clinical and research goals of the DSM, the three com-
mentators offer different perspectives on this conflict.
Adopting Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and
practical knowledge (episteme and phronesis), Owen
Whooley argues that there is a rather deep, metaphysical
divide between the research and clinical goals of DSM-III/
IV: the search for universal laws versus individualized care
of the particular patient. He illustrates this vividly with the
proposed dimensional measures for DSM-5. Aside from
the practical matters such as that clinicians will find them
cumbersome, of no practical use, and won’t use them, they
also represent, philosophically, an effort to treat human
beings and human suffering as quantifiable entities who
can be evaluated with quantitative measures as opposed to
interpretation and judgment.
Joseph Pierre focuses on what he might call the DSM
architects’ own confusion regarding the goal and use of
the manual. While they subject the clinician to the diag-
nostic criteria in the service of promoting research, the
categories with their criteria impede research as much as
they facilitate it. Citing the RDoC, Pierre points out that
the most significant research may be done outside the
confines of the DSM categories. Finally, Aaron Mishara
and Michael Schwartz point to the clinical/research con-
flict as a consequence of basing DSM-III on a Hempelian
scientific model; they argue that a DSM designed with the
ideal-type structure they advocate would eliminate the
clinician/researcher split and would in fact serve the two
groups equally well.
Finally this six-question exercise ends appropriately with
a grand question (related to the earlier question regarding
attitudes toward change): do the problems of the DSMs
warrant a major overhaul? Consistent with his previous
response arguing for a conservative attitude toward
change, Frances argues that the state of psychiatric science
dictates minimal change, not the “paradigm shift” pro-
posed by the DSM-5 architects, and not any other form of
major overhaul. He invokes the NIMH Research Domain
Criteria project (RDoC) that promises to change the scien-
tific landscape of psychiatry in the future. Pending findings
from that endeavor, which may indeed warrant a signifi-
cant refashioning of the DSM, we should hold tight and
await the return of the RDoC jury.
The first commentary flows neatly from Frances’ closing
remark. Michael First provides a clear description of the
NIMH project, clarifying that this is research project, not
an alternative diagnostic manual. But it is a research pro-
ject whose findings may significantly affect all DSMs thatfollow in its wake. In a second commentary Ronald Pies
reviews his effort at imagining an alternative diagnostic sys-
tem, described more thoroughly in Bulletin 2. His proposal
involves two innovations: basing the system on prototypal
diagnostic constructs, and dramatically reducing the num-
ber of diagnoses from several hundred to a large handful.
Finally, Joel Paris tackles the major innovation of DSM-5,
the introduction of a variety of dimensional measures. His
critique overlaps with some of the discussion in the previ-
ous question on utility – for the obvious reason that the
introduction of such measures involves both questions,
utility and alternate systems. He is in agreement with pre-
vious discussion of this topic – indeed, we have not had a
positive response, either from Frances or any of the com-
mentators, toward the proposed dimensional measures.
Paris also expresses an agreement with commentators of
Question 5, that the manual might work better by being
split into two: a shorter version for clinicians and a more
detailed version for researchers. Such a split would cer-
tainly work for Pies’ proposed alternative system, and it
again touches on the issue of utility.
It is around question 5, utility, that Allen Frances and I
have been in most disagreement. He certainly recognizes
that DSM-IV will be dissatisfying to each of its users in its
own way; but committed as he is to a single manual, he is
probably right that DSM-IV does a reasonable job of rec-
onciling the diverse goals of its different interest groups. I
do remain convinced that for their work clinicians only
need prototypal descriptions (which are in fact included in
DSM-III/IV), although I can also agree that the criteria
have played a role in reinforcing the prototypes. For me
the diagnostic criteria have had a complicated course.
They certainly play a role in reinforcing reliability across
clinical and research settings. That accomplished and the
prototypes in place, they lose their usefulness for clini-
cians. With regard to the research community, the diag-
nostic criteria have played an ambiguous role: on the one
hand assuring reliability across research settings, on the
other hand restricting research by forcing research to
work within the criterial boundaries. I agree with Owen
Whooley that the manual with its diagnostic criteria and
its proposed dimensional measures does expose a deep
discord between conflicting visions of people and psycho-
pathology. I also agree with Joseph Pierre regarding a core
contradiction in the DSM structure: that it is designed to
support research but in the end imposes strictures that
force researchers to work outside the manual. Finally, I
am sympathetic to the way in which Aaron Mishara and
Michael Schwartz’s analysis converges with Pies’ in the
next section, the restructuring of the manual around a
small group of superordinate diagnostic categories. This is
of course the lumping strategy; I am not convinced that
the DSM approach of splitting into hundreds of diagnoses
has accomplished much.
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one. Allen Frances makes a convincing case that, pending
more definitive science than currently available, we should
stick with the DSM that we have, and, in agreement with
Joel Paris, without the dimensional measures currently
planned. But if there is to be a more definitive science, the
NIMH Research Domain Criteria project as described by
Michael First seems like the best prospect. What we all
agree about – Frances, the commentators, and myself – is
the uncertainty as to whether the RDoC project will suc-
ceed in becoming the real paradigm shift it promises to be.Competing interests
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